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Abstract
The discourses around games have tended to focus upon either their
artefactual qualities or the phenomenological experience of play. In both
cases, games are primarily to be understood singularly. An alternative
approach, related to Foucault’s archaeological methods, is to focus upon
the manner in which games share player practices with earlier games.
This technique can be applied to all eras of games, and is not merely
restricted to videogames – indeed, a significant proportion of the player
practices of videogames descend directly from the player practices of
tabletop games, especially in terms of the progenitive role of tabletop
role-playing games for contemporary digital entertainment. Such player
practices can be broadly understood in terms of interface (how the player
engages with the game), world (what the player imagines is happening),
or the agency practices that connect the interface and the world.
Three propositions concerning the relationships between fictional setting
and designed rule systems within games are explored, the last of which
stresses the idea that ‘no-one plays alone’ i.e. that all play entails
continuity of its practices over and above variation of those practices.
These propositions are used to demonstrate three aesthetic flaws that are
peculiar to, or particularly relevant for, videogames. This in turn leads
to a discussion of the ways that commercially successful games have
always proceeded by leveraging the existing networks of practice. The
result is an alternative perspective for game design, game scholarship, or
game critique, one that foregrounds the role of player practices.
Keywords
player practices, aesthetics, play aesthetics, games, fiction, rules,
lineages
I. Player Practices
The claim that ‘no-one plays alone’ draws attention to the idea that
play, wherever it occurs, is conditioned by prior experiences of play. As
such, no player, no game designer, and no-one who studies play and
games does so without belonging to several lineages of play (Bateman,
2016b) that connect all play activities into a diverse and dispersed web
of influences, a set of cultural traditions conditioned by (and, over
geological time, conditioning the development of) the aesthetic motives
for play (Bateman, 2016a). This paper presents a set of three rules
(or, better, rubrics) that appear to govern the relationships between the
rule-governed aspects of games and their imaginative worlds. These in
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turn are used to highlight aesthetic flaws relating to these propositions.
Before this can be discussed, however, it is necessary to discuss the
relationship between rules and fiction, how this has been presented
within the discourse of game studies, and how this relates to game design
practices.
Traditional game design descends from the practices of tabletop game
design, that is, writing rules, now generally called ‘game mechanics’
(Sicart, 2008), that are then implemented into programmed systems. This
method works, and is widely used in the digital games industry which
uses a document (or more recently, an online surrogate) to organise the
rules guiding development. However, thinking about game design purely
as rules misrepresents the practical aspects of the design process by
obscuring the relationship between games and players, a point brought
into focus by Aarseth’s (2007) critique of the concept of an ‘ideal player’
implied by the rules.
Furthermore, games are never invented from nothing: they exist as
variations of successful player practices. This way of understanding
games – in terms of the player practices passed on between
interconnected lineages of games – runs contrary to many conventional
methods of thinking about games, both in commercial development and
the discourses around it.
For instance, in their seminal text Rules of Play, Salen and Zimmerman
(2003) usefully deploy three distinct schemas to carve games into rules
(game mechanics), play (experience), and culture (context). Looking at
games from the perspective of player practices necessarily interrelates
these three elements: the culture of playing in a particular way is shared
by both the artefacts and the players, who are in turn organised into a
(loose) community.
For the purpose of this paper, a ‘player practice’ is anything that a
player has learned to do consistently. This includes, for instance, using
the right stick on a controller to move the camera object, pressing a
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button to jump, smashing boxes to look for power-ups, and imagining
that moving an animated ‘doll’ in a depicted space entails ‘entering’
the implied fictional world. The underlying use of ‘practice’ has a long
and distinguished history in philosophy, far beyond Foucault’s (1972)
discussion of discursive practices that underpins this paper, arguably all
the way back to the notion of praxis in Aristotle.
In direct parallel to Foucault’s archaeological methods, a focus on player
practices entails identifying networks of connectivity. For Foucault,
statements could be linked together into networks, and the relationships
between those statements within the network characterized “discourse
itself as a practice” (1972, p. 42). Foucault’s ‘discursive formations’
are thus descriptions of practices that condition and influence what can
be said in any given ‘enunciative field’ e.g. biology, natural history,
mathematics – they are the networks of statements and the practices
that relate those statements. Mirroring Foucault’s terms, studying player
practices highlights ‘play formations’ that condition and influence how
games are both made and played within various ‘fields of play’, the
implications of which will hopefully become clear as this paper
progresses.
This notion of a player practice should not be confused with the (related)
concept of a community of practice advanced by Lave and Wenger
(1991). Although this also descends from the philosophical discussion
of practices, and thus has significant similarities, Lave and Wenger’s
concept is expressly about learning within a group that is personally
connected by some means. Conversely, a player practice can pass down a
lineage of games without the players and game developers ever forming
a community of practice in Lave and Wenger’s sense. This is the case
precisely because player practices can be embodied in game artefacts as
well as in what players learn from playing with such systems. Indeed,
core to the very idea of a player practice is that the process of making
games entails learning player practices and then using them normatively
to prescribe the construction of a new game, whether consciously or
otherwise.
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As noted above, thinking in terms of player practices is a significantly
different perspective from thinking about games as artefacts comprised
of rules. One particular academic approach has been to treat games
as comprised of ‘real’ game mechanics, which can be modelled
mathematically, and a ‘wrapper’ of fiction, which certain scholars
contend can be treated as having only secondary importance. This
constitutes a bias with ontological (‘mechanics are what is real about
games’) and phenomenological (‘mechanics are secondary in the play
experience’) aspects, one that can be found in Eskelinen (2001), Aarseth
(2004, 2012b), Juul (2005), Kirkpatrick (2011) and others who claim
that the experience of fiction will “fade into the background” once “the
engagement with the game becomes an obsession with the game goals
and mechanics” (Aarseth, 2012b, p. 490). While this bias has in no
way tarnished the quality of the academic work such scholars have
conducted, I have nonetheless suggested that this peculiarly dismissive
attitude towards imagined experience is rooted in the play preferences
of these scholars, and cannot be taken as universal; indeed, it can be
misleading if it is taken as axiomatic (Bateman, 2013a).
A significant problem with the view that games are ‘really’ crunchy
mechanics and that the player ultimately discards the fictional world –
expressed by Kirkpatrick as becoming “just a backdrop” (ibid, p69) –
is that the specific game mechanics tightly constrain the ‘theme’ that
can be attached. Game designers cannot simply treat the functional
elements of a design as something that can be transplanted willy-nilly
without utterly mauling the process of game design. This ‘wrapping
paper fallacy’ (Bateman, 2013b) which treats fiction as interchangeable
and irrelevant (because only the systems are assumed to matter) conceals
the importance of imagined experiences for all play. This and other
forms of what I have rather theatrically dubbed ‘fiction denial’
(Bateman, 2013a) obscure the material, social, and phenomenological
foundations of play. If we want to understand the play of games of all
kinds, we need to be open to understanding their player practices, both
in terms of interface and agency, and also in terms of their imagined
worlds, even though the latter matters more to some players than others.
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Contemplating games from the perspective of their player practices is
largely impossible while we treat a game purely as an artefact. Instead,
we must be open to appreciating not only the way individual games are
played, but the connectivity between the player practices of one game
and those of the lineages it connects to, a method that can be related
to Foucault’s approach to analysing discourse (Foucault, 1972). To fully
explore this, we need a perspective that stresses that play is never a
solitary activity, since no player can play in complete isolation from the
practices of others.
II. The Rules of Game Worlds
One approach to game design, adroitly discussed by game designer Dan
Cook (e.g. Cook, 2007) is built upon productive reductionist principles
– splitting games into components. This can be considered bottom-up
design. I use this kind of technique often in board game design and
occasionally in videogames, and it’s an effective approach in many
instances. An alternative is top-down design, whereby the world is
already established and the open question is how to support play within
that setting. This is a technique I have also used, particularly on projects
where the fictional world is determined in advance e.g. license
adaptations.
In the case of bottom-up design practices, game developers have to be
careful since by being the conduit for the final design and world, they can
introduce aesthetic problems that cannot be anticipated until the artefact
under development can be put into contact with players (see Section III
below for examples). Such problems are typically solved in successful
projects through iteration: people are sat down with the game and the
developers learn how new players come to engage with it, using what is
observed to adjust the game’s content (both mechanically and in terms of
world or setting).
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While the discourse of game designers provides ample opportunities
for an exchange of ideas pertaining to the designed systems of games
(i.e. their game mechanics), the question of the relationship between
those systems and the fictional content of game worlds is one that
remains ill-defined. In an academic context, it is not surprising that this
has remained largely on the side-lines since the common reluctance to
take fiction entirely seriously (as already discussed) makes it harder to
explore the consequences of the central role of fiction both in games
(Bateman, 2011) and in other artworks, a point discussed in depth by
philosopher of art, Kendall L. Walton (1990).
However, a discussion between myself and Dan Cook within the
comments of one of our blogs (Bateman, 2013b, and Cook, 2013)
opened up new perspectives on the relationship between ‘rules’ and
fiction, and suggests three propositions pertaining to their interrelations
that are worth considering more closely. It is these three propositions that
I wish to discuss in the section below, before moving to the aesthetic
consequences of these premises, and the implications for our
understanding of both games and game design.
I shall term these propositions the Rules of Game Worlds, and identify
three such rules, which are perhaps better understood as guidelines or
rubrics. This discussion proceeds in accordance with my claim that rules
and fiction interrelate since the former depend upon the latter and the
latter upon the former (Bateman, 2011). Thus, while we can distinguish
between setting and system, we have made an error if we think this is the
only way or the best way of conceptually organising the artefactual basis
of played experiences.
Incongruous Settings
The first problem Cook identifies is when the setting encourages players
to understand the play of the game in a way that is contrary to how the
mechanics function. Cook suggests that the setting “activates schema
in the player that fail to ease understanding of the system dynamics”
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(Cook, 2013, no page). This gives us the first proposition concerning the
relationship between rules and fiction in respect of game worlds:
First Rule of Game Worlds: Setting and mechanics must accord.
Ordinarily, the game designer wants the player to learn to play easily
according to the mantra for commercial success popularised by Nolen
Bushnell “easy to learn, hard to master” (Bogost, 2009, no page), and
this is best attained by aligning setting and mechanics. A notable
exception to this rule occurs when a game is intended to discombobulate
the player, as was attempted in the insanity cutaways in Eternal
Darkness’ (Silicon Knights, 2002).
This word ‘schema’ that Cook deploys is taken from psychology, e.g.
Piaget (1926), although it comes from philosophy prior to the divorce
between the two fields, and was coined by Immanuel Kant (1781). The
idea is that we have in our minds certain ways of understanding certain
situations – schema, or mythologies (Bateman, 2012, 2014a) – and these
come into play associatively since our memories are associative via
the hippocampi (Bateman, 2014b). As a consequence, it is usually bad
practice to have players’ prior associations disrupt their understanding of
a game’s systems, that is, the game mechanics. Players might eventually
overcome this and learn the way the game works, but in general an
incongruous setting remains unsettling even after the game is learned.
Cook (2013, no page) gives an example from his game Triple Town (Spry
Fox, 2010):
In Triple Town, we initially made the bears into children. Mechanically,
the bears were obstacles that you wanted to remove. When they were
children, many players activated the schema that they should be protected.
Expectations did not match mechanics. Confusion, irritation and uneasiness
results.
Part of my purpose in writing Imaginary Games (2011) was to stress that
when we talk about the aesthetics of play it matters whether setting and
mechanics (fiction and function) align. To be aesthetically satisfying to
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a player, it is vital to allow for this since (as Cook notes) the player’s
experience is always filtered through their world. An odd consequence
is that a player’s prior experiences are as much a part of their play as the
game itself – and there is a style of play (and a set of design approaches
that correspond to it) that makes the dominant setting not that of the
fiction but of the mechanics.
Mathematics Imply Settings
The second problem Cook identifies is presented as an opportunity:
“self-contained systems of value” provide opportunities for “a wider
variety” of settings (Cook, 2013, no page). In fact, Cook notes that
certain styles of games (puzzle games, strategy games, numbers-heavy
combat, to use examples that I had previously offered to him) are
playable without setting. This leads Cook to the point that something like
chess, which is mathematical (topological) at base, is easier to transpose
between settings than a game that depends on contextual content.
However, we should be careful about making assumptions about the idea
of games without setting, that is, without representation since it can be
objected that mathematics are already a representation (Yablo, 2002).
As a result, mathematical games already have a ‘setting’ of a certain
kind. This is what is sometimes called an ‘abstract’ theme, although
this can be a misleading terminology. The implication of recognising
the representational aspects of mathematics is that when a new fictional
setting is applied to, say, chess, we aren’t so much adding a setting
that wasn’t there, we’re actually merging its mathematically-implied
‘abstract’ base-setting into a fictional one. The chess mechanics are a
little mechanical sub-world with its own representational implications
that are not negotiable in the same way that any fictional content merged
with it might be. Even if you changed the names of the pieces to X1, X2,
X3 etc. the rules of chess would still feel like a power struggle because
that’s what they mechanically represent.
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From this follows the second proposition concerning the relationship
between rules and fiction in respect of game worlds:
Second Rule of Game Worlds: Any and all mechanical sub-worlds must
merge with the game world.
What made the wrapping paper fallacy appealing was the recognition of
two utterly distinct worlds – the abstract world of the mechanics, and
the representational game world. But the former can only be removed
from the latter if in itself it successfully supplies a sufficient base-
setting. Chess does – it’s a spatial contest, and anything that supports
that metaphor will merge with it, even contexts outside of battle like The
Simpsons (in part because metaphors of conflict are transposable into any
human or animal relations). But you can’t strip (say) bingo or a point-
and-click adventure down to a plausible base-setting because the core
play isn’t forming a self-contained system in the same way. Bingo relies
upon its community experience (no bingo player could desire a single-
player variant) and adventures rely upon their fictional content in a way
that is effectively case-by-case rather than a defined and reusable system,
even though the lock-and-key puzzle approach does form such a system,
and recurs in many kinds of game.
It might be objected that the second proposition is the same as the first,
that setting and mechanics must accord. However, not all mechanics give
us base-settings, only those that form what Cook terms “self-contained
systems of value” (2013) or something like it. Furthermore, it is possible
to merge any number of such systems provided they accord with the
fictional world. Indeed, playground worlds (Bateman, 2006a) often add
games-within-games because they can easily be merged; the 90s style
arcade games in 90s-set San Andreas (Rockstar North, 2004), for
instance, or gambling in Red Dead Redemption (Rockstar North, 2010).
Merging is also possible in more aesthetically satisfying ways e.g. the
circuitry-based influence game within the robot-massacre classic
Paradroid (Braybrook, 1985), which makes the game so memorable
because the ‘mini-game’ in itself gives the paradigm of the entire
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experience of possessing and discarding droids, a style of play that went
on to influence the first Grand Theft Auto (DMA Design, 1997).
This second rule also challenges the ‘two distinct worlds’ implied by
‘rules vs. fiction’ (Juul, 2005). Many games are one coherent fictional
world and many congruent mathematical/mechanical worlds that have
been merged with it, and often (but not always) with each other. Games
that allow you to build or tinker with devices as well as deploy them for
racing or combat also show this merging, from the 80s tabletop games
like Car Wars (1980) and BattleTech (Wiesman et al., 1984) to Forza
(2005) and Kerbal Space Program (2011) now. It is misleading to think
that the mechanical world could be built and only then ‘wrapped’ in cars,
mechs, or spacecraft. Rather, at all stages the fictional world and the
mechanical worlds must merge congruently, and often it is the fictional
setting that informs the design of the mechanical sub-worlds.
Nonetheless, each base-setting for each mathematical sub-world is also
reusable, just as character archetypes and plot tropes are reusable in
narrative fiction. This ability to reuse patterns, however, does not and
cannot make the base-settings more fundamental than the fictional
worlds, although they can certainly be more important to a subset of
players.
Play as a Practice
The last of the problems Cook identifies is particularly relevant to
anyone with an interest in games and play. In my remarks about the
wrapping paper fallacy (Bateman, 2013b), I provided the example of
a sporting game as antithetical to this conceptual viewpoint because
the mechanics – while necessary to their play – aren’t the locus of the
player’s enjoyment. Cook (2013, no page) summarizes this issue nicely:
You can retheme/reskin a sport and it loses the vast majority of its value.
The culture and the community around the game has turned into an intricate,
many layered game of its own. The chants, the commentators, the game
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night scheduling, the tribal associations are the real game. To copy out the
core mechanics and give them a new game is like copying out raw DNA and
thinking you have a complete ecosystem of living and breathing organisms.
Cook suggests that building a new game bottom-up is especially
challenging as it’s like “terraforming a barren world” where you must
“build up culture and community from scratch” (2013, no page),
stressing the immense difficulty of this task. This is correct, when
considered from a bottom-up perspective. However, from a top-down
perspective the problem seems radically different: the game designer
still needs to build up their own culture and community, but they begin
with ‘neighbouring’ fictional world cultures to provide ‘settlers’. It’s
something that marketing departments recognise, although generally fail
to know how to productively influence. People enjoy certain kinds of
fictional worlds, and seek their entertainment within those media that
deliver those specific kinds or anything like them.
The reason generic fantasy and urban horror novels are good sellers is
that they already have their collective culture and community. Genre
fiction forms superset fictional worlds – what I call, after Charles Segal’s
(1986) observations on the interconnectedness of Greek mythological
stories, a megatext (Bateman, 2013). Whatever the nuances of an
individual book series, its mythology is rooted in a wider frame of
reference, one that spans many other books and series that at first glance
are entirely isolated. Mash-up movies like Shrek (Adamson and Jenson,
2001) – and mash-up fighting games like Soulcalibur II (2002) and
Super Smash Bros. (1999) – show that they aren’t as isolated as they may
at first seem – they are ‘close enough’ that other worlds can be made
out of collisions between their otherwise isolated content. What’s more,
there are connections between otherwise isolated fictional worlds via the
people engaged with them: both the readers and the writers of fiction
genre participate in the practice that sustains that genre.
Videogames are no different, but as well as participating in the practices
of world (fantasy, science fiction, crime) players participate in the
interface and agency practices that can also be described in terms of
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game mechanics. The first-person shooter (FPS) is not defined by its
perspective but by the practices of those players who participate in
the FPS culture. The games certainly do affect this – Halo: Combat
Evolved (2001) significantly altered the practices of the FPS (dropping
the inventory in favour of just two weapons, adding vehicles), as did Call
of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (Infinity Ward, 2007) by putting RPG-like
advancement mechanics into the multiplayer mode.
However, changes to mechanics only become changes to practices when
players actually like what changed and then seek more of the same. Also,
some changes fork the practices into two different cultures, as Battlefield
1942 (Digital Illusions, 2002) and its successors have done. The words
used to form genre terms don’t reflect the practices very well, because
as players (if not as scholars) we’re trained to see games in boxes like
‘FPS’ that seem to pick out the important feature but only describe how
that practice split from its predecessors. The reason for the name ‘first-
person shooter’ is that most shooters in the 80s were rendered in 2D, so
the 3D first-person perspective was a step in a new direction.
From this follows the third proposition concerning the relationship
between rules and fiction in respect of game worlds:
Third Rule of Game Worlds: No-one plays alone.
This, indeed, is a stronger proposition than the previous two, since
it applies to all games, and indeed to all fictional media. Even the
most dedicated solo player is embedded in interface, world, and agency
practices that are sustained by a community. Even a designer who makes
a game that only they will ever play relies upon many others to facilitate
the making of that game (especially on an industrially manufactured
device like a computer!) as well as the communities that nourished the
games that taught them the practices of play they riff off. No-one plays
alone, because to learn to participate in the practices of play – whether
narrative, mechanical, or both – requires players to have been part of a
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wider culture. Indeed, Miguel Sicart (2009) suggests that to be a virtuous
player, you need to recognise your relationship with other players.
This rule seems odd, since it doesn’t seem to be about the relationship
between rules and fiction, mechanics and setting. This is because
contemporary views of our world have misled us into thinking
everything is explicable in isolation. This is a hangover from the
Victorian sciences and their mythology of the universe as a giant
mechanism (Bateman, 2012), a view that, while often useful, can obscure
the vital connectivity between things. Terms like ‘emergent’ and
‘superorganism’ try to hold onto this older perspective by ignoring
complex networks and treating them as still a single thing i.e. as still
isolated provided we change the scale that we look at them. There’s
a place for this, but there’s also a place for exploring the network
connections themselves, and we are currently at a time where we need
the latter perhaps more than the former (see Bateman, 2014).
New game designers often seek to amaze the world with their utterly
original design – which then inevitably flops. I have certainly had this
experience several times. This happens primarily because playing games
is not simply about isolated artefacts (‘the game’) that are played by
individual players. When seemingly original game concepts take flight
it’s because existing communities of players pick them up – one games
journalist, for good or ill, is always talking to a community of players
who must share some commonality of practice with that writer or they
would not read them. This can be a common games platform (even in the
80s, games magazines succeeded primarily by being about one kind of
microcomputer), or shared aesthetic values for play, or just shared values
for talking about the practices of play. Specific examples can be found
in the context of 80s arcade player practices (Bateman, 2015b) and the
way contemporary games share continuity of practice with the last five
millennia of play (Bateman, 2015a).
Cook’s terraforming metaphor is only lacking the idea that a new place
to live creates a new practice from roots in existing practices – the
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terraforming is just a means to an end, and that end is settlement
(something Cook clearly recognises). Understanding that your ‘settlers’
are choosing between different places to settle – different games to play
– helps game designers recognise that since no-one plays alone (or, to put
it another way, no-one plays in a vacuum) game developers are always
recruiting their metaphorical settlers from other game worlds. A few are
novelty seekers, but most find it easier to get into a game if originality is
tempered with familiarity, both in the mechanics and the setting.
III. The Aesthetic Flaws of Games
The guidelines for creating game worlds that came out of my discussions
with Dan Cook are practical principles for how the fictional world of
a game (where its narratives will be set) connect with its mathematical
systems (where its mechanics operate). These propositions might have
more general forms that could include other artworks, but for now let
us simply accept them as descriptive ‘rules’, so they can guide an
investigation into how games can produce aesthetic flaws of kinds that
other artworks simply do not.
Each of these propositions can be used to reveal a specific kind of
aesthetic flaw unique to games – and indeed, can reveal a schism
between different aesthetic values for play that leads to different kinds
of aesthetic flaws. This is key to the discussion that follows, for we
must appreciate that ‘aesthetic flaw’ is not an absolute claim, nor is it
‘merely subjective’: an aesthetic flaw occurs between a game and its
player as a direct result of a difference in values (cf. Bateman, 2014). The
arguments that follow are phenomenological, and based on observations
of players, as well as observations of my own play, and are presented
in the manner of Wittgenstein (e.g. 1953) more than any explicitly
empirical methodology, despite entailing some empirical observations.
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Ruptures
The first kind of flaw that can occur in the aesthetics of play is the one
that has produced the most heat and least light in discussions of games.
It is intimately tied up with the First Rule, that ‘setting and mechanics
must accord’, or as I might equivalently say in line with Juul (2005), that
the fiction and the rules must accord. Why does this constitute a rule?
The crucial point to understand is the one raised in connection with the
Second Rule i.e. that the rules of a game, its mechanics and systems,
are representations of a very particular kind – namely mathematical
representations. This is important to appreciate, because we do not often
acknowledge that numbers and formulae are at heart representative,
despite this being well-established in the philosophy of mathematics.
The number ‘three’ is a representation of cardinality: every collection
of three objects, like the three rules of game worlds, is thus represented
by the number three. Similarly, the bell curve ‘shape’ we depict by
graphing the Gaussian function of (say) two six-sided dice represents
the distribution of results from such a roll. It is precisely because
mathematics can and must represent that the sciences that deploy
equations (such as physics) are able to derive formulae that represent
phenomena like gravity and electrical flow.
But of course, every game is also a representation in the same way
that other artworks are: using Walton’s (1990) terms, they are sensory
depictions, like paintings, sculpture, and music, or narrations, like books,
poetry and radio plays, or hybrids of the two, such as television, comics,
and films. This is precisely where the trouble starts, because whenever
there are multiple forms of representation working together, there is
the possibility of different aesthetic values clashing. This is precisely
the unrecognised problem at the root of the mythic hydra that is the
purported narratology vs. ludology skirmish (cf. Frasca, 1999, Aarseth,
2012a) and in recent fights over what is confusingly termed ‘formalism’
(cf. Lantz, 2015) but which seems broadly equivalent to what is
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sometimes called ludology or ludocentrism or some other ludo-prefixed
neologism.
A rupture occurs when a player is enjoying a game in one aesthetic
mode but their imaginary experience is interrupted by an intrusion in
another mode – and there are two common examples. The first occurs for
any player whose aesthetic values have formed around the mathematical
representations of a game – broadly, the ludology position as Kirkpatrick
(ibid) presents it. Such players resent the inclusion of animated film clips
(cut scenes or cinematics) since these elements do not form part of their
aesthetic experience, per se. They cause a rupture in the mathematically-
structured world they are enjoying by ‘forcing’ the player to operate in
a narrative mode. Equivalently, a player whose experience was primarily
within a depictive or narrative mode will experience a rupture whenever
the mechanical system bluntly forces its way into awareness, for
instance, by encouraging the player to make a decision with mechanical
benefits that does not fit the imaginary world they were playing within.
Note that the same game could produce a rupture in opposing modes
for different players, and that what constitutes an aesthetic flaw for
someone from a Kirkpatrick-style position could be an aesthetic strength
for others. Despite the interruption of the mechanical play, Final Fantasy
games from VII onwards (Square, 1997) are enjoyed by many players
precisely because the extensive use of narrative cut scenes heightens the
sense of connection to the world, even though this also ruptures the game
experience for others.
Inelegance
The second way that games can manifest aesthetic flaws relates to the
Second Rule of Game Worlds, that every mechanical ‘sub-world’ must
also align with the fictional world of the game. The point here is that
for most games there is not a single mechanical system feeding into the
fictional experiences but rather many. As an extreme example, consider
Cooking Mama (Office Create, 2006) with its disparate, mechanically
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unrelated cooking mini-games that are still united within a fictional
narrative of cooking such-and-such a meal. Similarly, the classic Access
Software games Beach Head (1983) and Raid Over Moscow (1984)
consist of a linear sequence of self-contained sub-games with only the
number of soldiers remaining carrying on from one stage to another.
The component games do merge with a common fictional world – but
this once-popular structure tends to feel uncomfortably clanky by
contemporary aesthetic standards.
Players preferring the mathematical mode perceive inelegance as a direct
consequence of any discontinuity between sub-worlds, such as the
previously stated examples. When the systems themselves are the
elements of primary importance to creating the fictional world of play,
elegance is experienced if the core mechanics conspire to effortlessly
deliver that world, to produce more from less. Many strategy games are
afforded this praise, although the original Super Mario Bros. Nintendo
(1985) is an interesting example of elegance that does not primarily rest
upon decision making. A design can be said to ‘lack elegance’, which is
to say, expressive simplicity, whenever contrary conditions hold, which
to be honest is the norm and not the exception in contemporary games.
Inelegance is thus the awareness of tension in the mechanical supports
to a fictional game world, a sense that the pieces do not fit together like
well-oiled cogs. There does not appear to be an equivalent problem for
those experiencing a game in a narrative or depictive mode, although
the excess of unrelated mechanics characterising inelegance is likely to
cause a rupture in such a case, and inelegance may be experienced along
with the rupture if the player has sufficient appreciation for mechanics.
Perplexity
The final kind of aesthetic flaw I want to draw attention to here is
of a slightly different nature, and relates to the Third Rule: no-one
plays alone. The essence of this rule is that an artefactual reading of
games, treating them as isolated objects, is an incomplete reading of a
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game (Bateman, 2015b) because every game that has ever been made,
or ever will be made, is situated in a network of player practices that
prepare the player for that experience (Bateman, 2015a). The clearest
example is the aforementioned FPS, the control scheme for which is
so ingrained among the majority of contemporary players that games
using modified forms of this scheme generate aesthetic displeasure.
This is what I am calling perplexity: the experience of re-learning what
has already been learned differently, or learning under conditions of
insufficient information e.g. a bad tutorial.
It is perhaps worth recognizing that many players of the mathematical
aesthetic persuasion are also lovers of puzzle-solving, the enjoyment
of which occurs within the imagined world and not to any significant
degree in the mechanics. The classic text adventure was enjoyed by
many of the same players who now enjoy complex strategy games. Such
players will enjoy picking up a game and learning to play it without
instruction because they possess what I term confusion endurance
(Bateman, 2014b). However, such experiences are not what I am calling
perplexity, and neither is being stuck on a puzzle usually an example of
perplexity (unless the player knows what to do, but cannot comprehend
how the game expects them to implement the required action).
Perplexity occurs because two sets of player practices – those of the
player, and those of the game’s creators – have collided instead of
aligning. The most typical example occurs when the people who make
the game insufficiently address the monumental problem of teaching
others to play (which is also the pragmatic reason that most mainstream
videogames have very similar control schemes). An interesting case
is Metroid Prime (Retro, 2002), which has interface practices utterly
different from other first-person shooting games. Players who give up
while learning the new control scheme have experienced perplexity in
my sense; those that master the practice required by this control scheme,
on the other hand, are likely to appreciate its uniqueness.
No-one Plays Alone 23
IV. Player Communities
Excluding young children, all players come to every game with their
own pre-existing player practices already well-established. This small
point has non-trivial consequences! Defender (Jarvis and DeMar, 1981)
was difficult for arcade players to learn because its interface practices
were nothing like the other arcade games of the late 70s and early 80s.
The computer strategy game Steel Panthers (SSI, 1995) uses a hex map
because thirty years earlier Avalon Hill’s second edition of Gettysburg
(1961) established the benefits of these over square maps. id Software’s
DOOM (1993) and Quake (1996) used arrow keys rather than WASD
because movement in most Western computer RPGs up to then had
been controlled that way, with mouse-look creeping in as an optional
alternative interface for games mounted on the Quake engine. Changes
were incremental, not revolutionary, because utterly innovative practices
become a barrier to play, creating negative word-of-mouth, a high risk of
bad reviews, and thus no eventual community.
Community is the big issue here since, as already noted, no-one plays
alone. Commercially successful game developers (and indie game devs
who earn enough to feed themselves) have in common that they either
made a game for existing communities of players, or they founded a
new community around their game. In all cases, the player practices are
contiguous with earlier player practices – either in terms of interface,
fictional world, or agency (which is to say, the intersection between the
two). The three work together, and all three are important – although
in different ways for different players, who may experience a variety of
aesthetic flaws as a result of their preferences.
Clashes between interface practices create perplexity; clashes between
world and agency create ruptures; clashes between agency and interface
generate inelegance. All discourage players from engaging in a new
community, but not all are strictly game design problems (rupture in
particular is often a narrative design issue). Successful game design
doesn’t have to minimise all these aesthetic flaws, because not all players
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are bothered by rupture, not everyone is sensitive to inelegance, and
some players willingly persist in the face of perplexity. But it is the last
of these flaws – perplexity – which is the greatest problem for games
courting a community of players, because players can adopt a new game
easily if its player practices are close to those they already know, and this
applies to interface, world, and agency practices.
If a game’s interface practices cause perplexity (by being different from
player expectations, founded on prior experiences) there is a barrier
erected around the game and only a minority of players will get through
it. Indeed, contemporary games have developed new community
practices to offset this exact problem e.g. wikis that provide detailed
information about player practices expressed as game mechanics, and
guides that introduce players to new practices gently. Even so, successful
new games achieve their success by taking advantage of existing player
practices, and only vary them to a relatively small degree, such that
players can switch from an existing player community to that of the new
game with minimal complications.
A few examples may be helpful. Blizzard’s all-conquering World of
Warcraft (2004) developed its practices from those of the Multi-user
Dungeons (MUDs), a unique kind of game exquisitely documented by
Aarseth (1997). Blizzard thus did not create a new community but rather
absorbed others that were already engaged in very similar player
practices. Firstly, the DikuMUDs that had near-identical practices to
WoW but used a text interface, followed by much of the MUD
community in general, including the other early ‘graphical MUDs’ like
EverQuest (Sony, 1999). Secondly, computer RPG players, since they
had very similar practices in interface, world, and agency, but usually
played in single-player worlds. Thirdly, tabletop role-players, from
whose player practices all these other communities descended (Bateman,
2011). World of Warcraft effectively monopolised the role-playing game
lineages, and their communities, through high production values, careful
community management, and a buffed-up version of the practices of
Dungeons and Dragons (Gygax and Arneson, 1974). It ultimately
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became such a huge player community that even the wellspring of its
player practices, D&D, began to copy it, with its fourth edition rules
clearly geared to appeal to the community that WoW had stolen away
from the table (Bateman, 2011).
Similarly, Mojang’s monolithic mega-hit Minecraft (Persson, 2009) was
readily available to a hugely diverse community of players because it
used a standard interface, one that descended from Quake’s mouse-look
combined with inventory mechanics from the computer RPG lineage,
those largely added to the pool of player practices by the seminal
Dungeon Master (FTL, 1997). Minecraft did not succeed by
monopolising existing communities, however, but by being able to be
played by a huge pool of players (thanks to its low-perplexity ‘standard’
interface, and a strong supply of wiki content to bridge the gap with its
high-perplexity crafting system). Once it was rolling, it then supported
hugely diverse player communities thanks to the open configuration of
its numerous regimes of play – from peaceful construction, to vicious
permadeath that descends from early digital D&D variants such as Rogue
(Toy and Wichman, 1980).
The significant growth in community was also fuelled by the ingenious
early access business model, which Minecraft both invented and
popularised. Unlike later schemes, Persson offered rising entry fees from
a very low starting point – about $10 when I got it, I think it’d been
half that when I first saw it, and later it was $20 and $30. Part of my
buying decision was precisely the thought that I didn’t want to pay
more later, and I’ll wager I’m not the only one who was drawn in
this way. This is one of two key reasons why Minecraft had to be an
indie project, and couldn’t have come from a publisher. The other is its
low-fi visual aesthetic, very much resembling my indie flop Play with
Fire (2006b) three years earlier, although to my knowledge there is no
direct connection between the two games, nor to Minecraft’s immediate
progenitor Infiniminer (Barth, 2009).
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In Minecraft’s case, we can see how its success did not primarily come
from its game design ingenuity, which merely provided the seed of
appeal around which its communities gathered. Its success was rooted to
continuity of player practices from the lineages of FPS (for interface) and
RPG (for world and agency). Minecraft cross-bred and thus hybridised
the two key videogame lineages, but it was its inventive business model
that provided a means of growing a new community organically and thus
had a far bigger part to play in its success than design innovation. This
is in no way a criticism. I have enormous admiration for the variations
to player practices that Minecraft introduced, which have still not settled
into any stable configuration in the games community at large.
Equivalently, superior community maintenance was more important to
World of Warcraft’s success than design innovation, of which it had
very little – and not because Blizzard isn’t full of extremely capable
designers. A gainful comparison can be made with id Software, the only
company to get significant traction from the shareware business model.
It innovated the ‘standard’ interface – but it built its community on pre-
existing interface practices, from the Western computer RPG lineages (as
noted above), and then grew a community with a non-standard business
model. Only when that community was established did id Software get
a chance to spread the now-standard mouse-look FPS interface (which
also leads to twin stick controls on consoles, via other developers’
variations).
V. Conclusion
Traditional game design works much of the time because game designers
are already part of a network of practice and thus can effectively
replicate and vary those player practices. Those capable of abstracting
these practices into ‘rules’ or ‘game mechanics’ inevitably end up in the
role of game designer since they can communicate play in the written
form which helps to hold big projects together. (Small teams can avoid
documentation entirely in many cases, but larger games have no other
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reasonable option). Nonetheless, the work of games designers will
succeed or fail according to how well they maintain and vary established
practices. When it fails, it is often because of unresolved conflicts over
precisely which practices are being replicated or modified – especially
in traditional publishing relationships. But successful game design has
always been embedded within existing player communities, and new
directions have worked far less often than variations on known themes,
no matter what players say about what they think they want.
Traditional marketing is an even less reliable method than game design
since the openly stated strategies (such as target demographics) utterly
miss the point about why spending money can fuel the formation of
communities. Players are already inside the communities for the various
big game brands (Mario, Call of Duty, Mortal Kombat, GTA etc.) but
can be enticed to play games with a similar interface, world, or agency.
Meanwhile, world-focussed media brands (Middle Earth, Disney, Lego,
Star Wars, Harry Potter) provide further opportunities to bring existing
player practices to their (largely zero-agency) communities, offering
substantial commercial benefits – at a substantial price. Indies can’t
afford to do this, so they typically just rip them off – just like the big
companies, actually! Tomb Raider (Core, 1996) comes from Indiana
Jones, just as Halo comes from Aliens (Cameron, 1986) with a Larry
Niven twist, and Call of Duty (Infinity Ward, 2003) comes from Medal
of Honor (DreamWorks, 1999), which comes from Saving Private Ryan
(Spielberg, 1998) – both concurrent Spielberg-produced projects. If these
examples of network connections for world-practices seem trivial, recall
that even the much-vaunted Braid (Blow, 2008) wholly depends upon
borrowing Mario’s player practices.
Foregrounding player practices is an antidote to the wrapping paper
fallacy and other forms of fiction denial that treat imagined experience
as secondary or irrelevant, but more importantly it allows us to better
understand both the differences between players and the intimate
connectivity between games and their lineages. Just as Foucault (1972)
re-evaluated discourses in The Archaeology of Knowledge and elsewhere
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to explore the practices that allow certain discourses to attain to
knowledge, thinking about games in terms of their associated player
practices allows us to better understand what we are dealing with when
we are making, studying, or critiquing games.
The three aesthetic flaws discussed above – rupture, inelegance, and
perplexity – demonstrate how interactions between interface practices
(e.g. controls, HUDs, online connections), world practices
(representation, fiction and imagination), and agency practices (that
interrelate the two) generate problems for certain players according to
their personal aesthetic values on the one hand, and the player practices
they have inherited from playing earlier games on the other. Indeed,
these two elements are closely related, since the aesthetic values players
possess seem to be inscribed by the player practices they have
participated with at least as much as they are related to their
temperament.
These aesthetic flaws aren’t a complete list of the ways in which a game
and a player could be aesthetically misaligned. However, they serve to
illustrate why certain arguments about games operate unproductively
since they proceed from different aesthetic presumptions – typically
a focus on the game’s mathematical systems versus a focus upon the
depictive or narrative aspects of its fictional world. There is no coherent
argument for claiming superiority or even ‘home field advantage’ to
either of these modes, because games operate in fairly unique ways
from other media whichever aesthetic mode we consider. It was never a
case of finding the ‘right way’ to analyse games: there were only ever
alternative methods.
I hope this brief enquiry provides some illumination on a subject that
too often lapses into dogma, and illustrates once again the core principle
of all my work in games, whether as researcher, philosopher, or game
designer: play is a diverse activity, and its aesthetic appreciation can
never be reduced to simple master principles. Rather, successful games
attain to that state because their artefacts are built around variations on
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the existing player practices. That’s what game design has always been
about – talk of ‘game mechanics’ is only a medium for the exchange of
ideas. We should not let it distract us from acknowledging our intimate
familiarity with the player practices of successful games, because we are
all a part of at least some of these communities and networks, and always
have been.
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